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This paper will locate the convergence of Foucault’s and Deleuze’s critico-political itinerary on the ethics of autopoiesis. Using primary research from a sociological study on bisexual lives, it will demonstrate the consonances 
of their respective theoretical insights about the potential of erotic “pleasure” and 
“desire” as forces of resistance. It takes as its point of departure Tuhkanen’s (2005-6) 
observation that “the way in which the queerness of Foucault’s ethics harmonizes with 
Deleuze’s work remains largely unconsidered”, a task that could be pursued by via 
Foucault’s research on the art of living/care of self. Firstly, we clarify the objectives of 
Foucault’s research in the later volumes of the history of sexuality project to show how 
it invites us to experiment with technologies of the self to defuse normative regimes 
by cultivating the work of desubjectification—autopoiesis, the re-writing of the self, 
becoming-other. The paper interprets empirical data of bisexual experiences with 
this Foucauldian framework to elucidate the ethico-political significance of affective-
relational experimentations in gender-crossings and sub-cultural practices of BDSM 
(bondage and discipline, dominance and submission, and sadomasochism) that 
hinge on the consensual exchange of power for erotic stimulation or pleasure. The 
analysis of these non-normative relations of intimacy and exchanges of pleasure will 
“read Foucault as a foreign body, pregnant with Deleuzianism, that already inhabits 
the centre of queer thinking” (Tuhkanen 2005-6). Our aim is twofold: to set the 
groundwork for further conversations between Foucauldian and Deleuzian thinking, 
and to highlight a lacuna in queer scholarship on bisexuality.
Background and Methodology
The bisexual narratives featured in this essay, and the Deleuzian concepts through 
which these are analysed, are drawn from Watson’s (2012) doctoral dissertation, a 
qualitative sociological study that explored the nexus of bisexuality and sex/gender 
diversity (see also Watson 2014). It principally argued that the master categories of 
sex, gender and sexuality are continually dismantled and revised through the lived 
realities that occupy in-between spaces of corporeality—heterosexual/homosexual, 
man/woman, male/female, and masculine/feminine. In these borderland spaces, self-
ascriptions of bisexuality are moving towards articulations of fluidity and inventive 
labelling (Owen 2011; Pallotta-Chiarolli 2010; Rust 2009; Watson 2014). Rather than 
simply recruiting self-identified “bisexuals”, Watson therefore sought persons 
whose intimate partner histories included relational connections with more than one 
gender. Consonant with the Deleuzian logic informing this study, individuals were 
not “named” as “bisexual”. For naming confers homogeneity onto those being 
named, thus provoking the question: who is doing the naming and whose interests 
are at stake? Deleuze and Guattari refer to the extensive usage of proper names/
common nouns that elides multiplicity with “dismal unity”; the “devious despotic” 
signification that ensures “unification of an aggregate they subsume” (1987, 27). 
To this end, Watson’s project also solicited beyond the conventional male/female 
gender divide. The final sample included men and women as well as sex/gender 
diverse individuals for whom the two-sexed model has in some way been disrupted 
by: adopting hormone therapy and/or surgery in order to present as their preferred 
gender (transgender); rejecting or blurring the gender binary (genderqueer); or 
biological anomaly (intersex). A purposive method, which utilised snowball sampling 
(Neuman 2006), resulted in a sample of 47 individuals (aged between 19 and 67) 
comprising 15 men and 15 women (who have never questioned their designated 
birth sex/gender), and 17 sex/gender-diverse persons. 
Data was collected via individual in-depth interviews (face-to-face or phone) that 
explored sex/gender/(bi)sexuality in terms of: self-expression; relationality; partner 
configurations; family; sociality; and public discourses. Interview transcripts were coded 
and analysed using NVivo (qualitative software) to identify emergent themes. The 
study underscored the ontological messiness of sexual realities that are complicated 
by embodied articulations of sex/gender diversity. Hence, participants utilised a 
cornucopia of descriptors to convey their sexuality including, bisexual, queer, bi-queer, 
gay-bi, polymorphous, polysexual, pansexual and bi-sensual, or rejected labels. It is 
from the vantage point of this muddied terrain that our dialogue between Foucault 
and Deleuze is located. Space constraints limit us to select narratives from Watson’s 
(2012) dissertation most pertinent to our Deleuzian-Foucauldian analyses. However, 
these stories typify the sample’s complexity and the central tenet of Watson’s thesis 
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that bisexuality is an epistemological viewfinder through which sex/gender/sexual 
bodies are rendered visible as multiplicities of ethical becoming-selves. Subsequent 
planned and forthcoming publications will offer a more comprehensive interrogation 
of Watson’s data. For a summary of participant profiles see Watson (2012, 2014).
Foucault’s fourfold ethics, an art of living, and the care of self
The first volume of the history of sexuality (1990)—a central text informing critiques 
of heteronormativity—has entreated significantly greater attention than the latter 
two volumes, the Use of pleasure (1990b) and the care of the self (1988c). The 
second volume, recasts the project as a “history of the experience of sexuality, where 
experience is understood as the correlation between fields of knowledge, types 
of normativity, and forms of subjectivity in a particular culture” (Foucault 1990a, 4; 
emphasis added). The concept of “experience” anchors the three analytical axes 
around which the Foucauldian corpus pivots: truth, power, ethics (or knowledge, 
governmentality, subjectivity). “Experience” thus figures as a prismatic lens for 
refracting both the interrogation of “an objective, anonymous, and general structure 
connecting fields of knowledge, types of normativity, and forms of subjectivity”, and 
the ethical cultivation of “a subjective self-relation of recognition” (Oksala 2004, 111). 
While analyses may focus on a particular domain of experience—truth, power, ethics—
these are inter-involved with no ordering conceptual or chronological hierarchy and 
“can only be understood one in relation to the others and cannot be understood one 
without the others” (Foucault 1998, 243).
An “axial” reading of the history of sexuality enables an investigation of the subversive 
potential of bisexual intimacies that remains mindful of the hetero-normative power 
that suffuses “sexuality”. As such, we perform our analysis from the standpoint of 
ethics, adopting Foucault’s understanding of experience or “limit-experience” 
as both structuring historical conditions and transformative force (O’Leary 2008, 
7). “Experience”, however, would not appear in Foucault’s subsequent works until 
around 1978, where he reconceptualised limit-experience as a movement of (un)
becoming that serves to “tear the subject away from itself” (Foucault 2000, 241). 
This later understanding of limit-experience turns on the dual meaning of the French 
word expérience, which can also mean “experiment”. Limit-experience, in other 
words, bespeaks a movement of desubjectification or becoming-other. With a more 
nuanced conceptualisation of (limit-)experience, Foucault characterised his work thus 
in the later phase of his intellectual life:
The experience through which we grasp the intelligibility of certain mechanisms 
[deviance, punishment, etc.] and the way in which we are enabled to detach 
ourselves from them by perceiving them differently will be, at best, one and 
the same thing. That is really the heart of what I do (Foucault 2000, 244). 
Accordingly, we analyse the stories of Watson’s (2012) respondents through this optic, 
exploring how the potential for limit-experience may be actualised by adjustments 
in role performance and bodily habits, and by the affective intensification of erotic 
pleasure. This analysis draws on two dominant leitmotifs that emerged in participants’ 
narratives—their subverting and/or transgressing of the gender binary, and erotic 
performance enacted through BDSM—activities by which they confront coded 
relations of power, and in the same movement, detach themselves from mechanisms 
of normativity by performing, embodying, and thus perceiving them, queerly.
By treating erotic pleasure as “material” for experimentations that negotiate both 
“hetero” and “homo” norms circumscribing their intimate relations, respondents 
cultivate a form of ethical self-fashioning. While a parallel may be drawn between 
participants’ ethical “use of pleasure” with the sexual ethics of Greco-Roman male 
elites (Foucault 1990b), we underscore Foucault’s point that one cannot expect to 
“find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another 
moment by other people”(1984, 343). What interests Foucault about the Greco-
Romans is not the specific content of their sexual ethics but the orienting praxis-
ideal of an art of living. The purpose of tracing the genealogies of problematisations 
(of deviancy, madness, etc.) descending through different eras is “to point out the 
proximity and the difference, and, through their interplay, to show how the same 
advice given by ancient morality can function differently in a contemporary style of 
morality” (Foucault 1988a, 247). Our argument, therefore, is that Foucault’s research 
on Greco-Roman sexual ethics extends an invitation to us to rearticulate the praxis-
ideal of an art of living in a contemporary context—which Watson’s (2012) respondents 
arguably perform.
Here, O’Leary’s (2002) reading of Foucauldian ethics is instructive for our analysis 
of bisexual intimacies and the reciprocity between the Foucauldian and Deleuzian 
itineraries. Building on Foucault’s fourfold analysis of ethical substance, mode 
of subjection, ethical work, and telos—the “what”, “why”, “how”, and “goal” of 
ethics—O’Leary makes the following proposals for a contemporary art of living. 
Firstly, because Foucault critically regards the subject as a “fictitious unity” and “sex” 
an “ideal point” consolidated by the discourses of sexuality, the ethical substance is 
the transcendental subject that must be refused (Foucault 1990a, 154-155). Secondly, 
if the self is not a given, the mode of subjection is the decision to embrace the open-
endedness of existence with an attitude that treats life as an art of ongoing crafting. 
Thirdly, Foucault’s critico-political project aims “to prise open the relations of truth-
power-subjectivity which make us the kind of individual that we are” (O’Leary 2002, 
153), hence, the ethical work involves practices of desubjectification, which may be 
cultivated with technologies of the self. These are knowledge-practices that: 
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and agentic but subjectless dimensions of self as we create ourselves as “a work of art” 
(1984, 350-351). It is on this conceptual ground that Foucault’s itinerary resonates most 
strongly with Deleuze and Guattari, for whom the creative process of self-production 
is fundamental to their canon. Indeed this process is likened to that of an artist’s 
palette from whence new forms emerge. Here, “multiple exchanges” between self 
and social figurations permit “diverse possibilities” that offer the aesthetic potential 
to reconfigure anew one’s corporeality (Guattari 1995, 7).
Autopoiesis is key to Deleuze and Guattari concept of becomings (Buchanan 1997) and, 
hence, provides a central plateau of thought from which to explore bisexuality in ways 
that bring to light the complex interplays with sex/gender (Watson 2012). Becomings 
comprise a diverse array of singularities that coalesce in fluid assemblages—social 
spaces of production that destabilise the unilinear and binary logic of traditional 
canons of thinking. According to Watson (2012), recalibrating bisexual theory through 
becomings rejects a hierarchical and authoritative system of organisation, and hence, 
delivers a “war-machine” against conceptual fossilisation. A war-machine, which 
is everywhere mobilised in the Deleuzian enterprise, is not military, but occupies 
cartographies of connections and extensions (Deleuze 1995, 33)—attacking the 
foundationalist assumptions that bear down and attempt to organise social process 
and production into tidy transcendent categories. Transcendent universals (abstract 
concepts), organise matter into social bodies that attempt to cohere the subject, 
to corral and constrain desire. Delineated by external representations (objects), 
transcendences variously consolidate as molar entities, strata, organisms, and 
majorities in Deleuzian idiom (for example, race, class, sex, religion). The war-machine 
is a space of nomadic thought, which dismantles binary regimes that overcode and 
police us as “wholes” (Deleuze and Parnet 2006, 106).
It is here that Deleuzian philosophy reveals its radical potential for reframing how (bi)
sexuality is understood. Of salience, Watson (2012) theorises that an epistemological 
space is made available to consider bisexuality beyond conventional constructions 
grounded upon genitality of partner. This offers an analytical position that more ably 
accommodates consideration of those who are sex/gender-diverse. The Deleuzian 
project seemingly installs a post-gender vision—a polysexual, multi-sexual reprisal 
that de-essentialises the body, sexuality and sexed identities (Braidotti 2002). The 
analytical problematic of the two-sexed system is replaced by “a thousand tiny sexes” 
that emerge in ever-changing configurations of assemblages, hence, “there are as 
many sexes as there are terms in symbiosis” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 213, 242). 
Deleuze and Guattari consider that the social categorisation of man/woman, as well 
as psychoanalytic narratives of psychical bisexual organisation (masculine/feminine), 
ignores how:
permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others 
a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, 
conduct, and ways of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a 
certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality Foucault 
(1993, 203).
Fourthly, if the task of critique is not to remove constraint or domination but to 
continuously open up possibilities for new socio-political decisions and arrangements, 
the telos is freedom, conceived not as an historical constant or ideal state but as 
constituted by relations, as the capacity to refused to be pinned down to a certain 
identity: the freedom to always become otherwise than before, or in Deleuzian terms, 
to become-other.
In searching for a way to detach ourselves from the confessional mode of subjection by 
which modern individuals are enjoined to decipher their “innermost truth” as particular 
subjects (of sexuality or otherwise), Foucault (2005) re-evaluated the relationship 
between the Ancient Greek maxims of: the renowned and widely-accepted injunction 
of gnōthi seauton (know thyself), and the forgotten precept of epimeleia heautou (the 
care of self). For the Greco-Romans, “know thyself” was twinned with, and functioned 
as a specific application of, the imperative to “care for the self” comprising three 
dimensions: “an attitude towards the self, others, and the world”; a form of attention 
turned towards “oneself”; and “actions by which one takes responsibility for oneself 
and by which one changes, purifies, transforms, and transfigures oneself” (Foucault 
2005, 10-11). However, through a gradual process involving the rise of theology—
which culminated in the “Cartesian moment”—the care of self came to be displaced 
by know thyself. Foucault’s re-evaluation of the epimeleia heautou thus refocuses 
attention on the affective, relational, and performative processes of embodiment—
or what Foucault (2005: 16) describes as the movement of askēsis and erōs—by which 
a person’s relation of self to self and others, the relation between subjectivity and 
truth, may be transfigured. 
Autopoiesis and Ethical Corpora
The care of self and the art of living, hence, articulate a praxis-ideal of autopoiesis. 
Although Foucault did not use the term as such, an ethics of autopoiesis can be 
drawn from the influence of Nietzsche in his writings. For Nietzsche adopts a certain 
“aesthetic attitude” that treats life, habits, and experiences as material to be worked 
on, formed and shaped as an “I” who is both a self-description and a self-creation 
(Nehamas 1985). This autopoietic work pivots on the recognition that the process of 
crafting is on-going and open-ended. As an aesthetic mode of subjection, one refuses 
the transcendental self and modes of normativity via practices of desubjectification: 
becoming-other. Importantly for our argument, Foucault underscores the productive 
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version of femininity that aligns to a normative performance and expression of the 
“female” body. Yet, Cherie actualises a queerly-embodied configuration—something 
that is both familiar and unfamiliar—what Freud (1919) termed the uncanny. It is the 
dissonance of the uncanny that perplexes and suggests an alien or extraneous form, 
challenging onlookers to peer within their own subjectivities. When in public with 
her (female) partner, Cherie commented that “people sort of tend to look at you and 
you can just see that they’re just processing—something does not compute”. Cherie 
does not become molar woman but rearranges its constituent parts into something-
other—a composite body, which, moreover, enables exploration beyond the limits 
of conventional sexuality. Cherie explained the sexual vicissitudes and boundary-
blurring of this queer embodiment that offers new sexual possibilities: 
I’m quite happy to sleep with women as a man, with men as Cherie, with 
other trannies as a man or Cherie, and so on. But I think it’s one of those 
things where the language falls down a little bit. Realistically, if you are a guy 
dressing up as a girl and you’re getting picked up by a guy who wants to 
believe you are a girl what does that make you? I mean technically bisexual 
is an adequate term but I don’t think it quite captures the full diversity of 
possibilities. 
Ewan’s (early 50s) genderqueer story similarly revealed autopoietic subjectivities 
rather than any attempt to authentically replicate “being” woman. Although currently 
married, it is a borderline narrative that does not attach to dominant polarities of sex/
gender and sexuality but nomadically weaves in between. Ewan’s story underscores 
this interstitial movement wherein notions of indeterminacy and incongruence 
become manifest. It is a nebulous sense of self, which Ewan repeatedly describes 
as “weird” and “freakish”. “My peripatetic life continues peripatetically,” he later 
reflected.
It is this distinctive nomadism of mind, corpora and biography—recalling the 
Nietzschean influence on the reciprocity between Deleuzian and Foucauldian 
sensibilities—which disallows Ewan from solidifying into a range of molar identities 
that his body has variously assumed: husband, father, pilot, gay lover, cross-dresser, 
trans woman. Ewan recounted his life-story as a non-linear series of becomings 
comprising: four marriages; parenthood; intermittent oestrogen hormone therapy; 
cross-dressing in women’s clothes; feeling maternal (rather than paternal); cohabiting 
in a “lesbian relationship” with a bisexual woman (Ewan “transformed” to Justine 
during this period); and cruising public toilets for “gay” sex. At the time of his 
interview, Ewan was in a state of flux—unsure of how to satisfy profound yearnings 
for femininity and sexual contact with men within a marital relationship:
Sexuality brings into play too great a diversity of conjugated becomings; 
these are like n sexes … Sexuality is the production of a thousand sexes, 
which are so many uncontrollable becomings. sexuality proceeds by the way 
of the becoming-woman of the man and the becoming-animal of the human 
… (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 278-9; emphasis in original). 
The conceptual scaffolding of autopoiesis accordingly offers a simpatico of thinking 
between Deleuze and Foucault that productively re-imagines how bisexuality is 
enacted, embodied and expressed. Watson’s (2012), respondents’ stories expose 
how bisexuality occupies indeterminate spaces of in-between that “play with different 
regimes of signs, and even nonsign states” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 21). Analytical 
focus, therefore, examines not what a label means—which for Deleuze (1995) is 
despotic, tyrannical and diagnostic, and for Foucault (1997) is identity-bound by ethical 
rules—but how it is produced and what ways of living are rendered possible. In doing 
so, ruptures and schisms are made apparent that allow polyvocalities of sexuality to 
surface, which the unified sex/gendered/sexual subject and its reliance on binary 
logic suppresses from view. Watson’s respondents thus conveyed their sexualities as 
a process of becoming that negotiates dominant binary discourses and culturally-
scripted categories, while carving out spaces of heterogeneity and movement 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987). Consonant with Foucault’s notion of desubjectification, 
Watson (2012) argues that participants’ lived realities “asignify” and “asubjectify” 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 9) the taken-for-granted idiom of LGBT by variously 
dismantling and reassembling dominant identity categories in fluid and inventive 
ways. The radical notion of asignifying bisexuality is not to evacuate comprehensibility 
but urges us to rethink the sexual body in terms of content and expression rather 
than structural form (Deleuze 1995, 21; Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 43).
Autopoietic Adventures
Selected narratives from Watson’s (2012) study illuminate the autopoietic landscape 
that we have mapped out thus far in our dialogue between Foucault and Deleuze. 
We begin with Cherie (late 30s), whose gender-crossing story is par exemplar of the 
autopoietic venture—what s/he “becomes” is literally an aesthetic project of the 
erotically-desiring self. Self-describing as a queer trannie, Cherie lives and presents 
for the most part as a male/man. However, weekend clubbing and swinger’s parties 
provide the forum to metamorphose into a “woman”. This en femme transformation 
entails a full makeover regimen including: gothic dress style; wig; cosmetics; “tucking” 
the penis, and adopting “feminine” affectations (walking with small steps one foot in 
front of the other and sitting with crossed legs). 
The process of “becoming-Cherie” is, from one perspective, filtered through a molar 
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the relationality that coheres between the self and its encounter with others, the 
relationality ushered by the willingness to accept unpredictability and be hospitable 
to what is strange and novel. The ethico-political force of autopoiesis, we argue, is 
to be harnessed from the body’s indeterminate capacity to affect and be affected. 
This is elucidated by the stories of those who experiment with BDSM play, an analysis 
of which is crucial to the dialogical exchange between Deleuze and Foucault, as it 
foregrounds the key point of disagreement between them: their respective analytics 
of “desire” and “pleasure”.
Becoming-other with BDSM
The affective potency of desire and pleasure that is enacted in BDSM expands 
thinking about sexual relations beyond normative boundaries of “coupling”. In other 
words, the relations respondents entered into are more profoundly contoured by 
terms other than the reigning signifiers (man/woman, husband/wife) that attempt to 
rule and bind multiplicities of subjectivity into an obedient unified subject. Deleuze’s 
radical rewriting of the relational body is strikingly evidenced in participants’ narratives, 
which explode gender signifiers, sending shards of stereotypes shooting off into all 
directions, before settling into new combinations and permutations of self. It is on 
this precipitous terrain that BDSM incites feverish debate, particularly from feminist 
critiques that position these practices as replaying patriarchal structures of gendered 
power.
Feminist arguments that attempt to co-opt BDSM within a paradigm of male 
dominance/female oppression are challenged by those advocating an ethics of sex 
positivism and sex radicalism. Pat Califia (2000), for example, provides a comprehensive 
overview of lesbian-feminist arguments that colour this fraught terrain, elucidating 
how the dogma of hard-line feminism in fact marginalises vast micro-realities of 
lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered people who derive consensual pleasure from 
pornography and BDSM. Here, relations are predicated by care and consideration 
not exploitation. Morgan (early 50s), a passionate genderqueer feminist who has 
attended but not participated in a women’s only BDSM group, highlighted this zone 
of contention:
Especially in female communities [BDSM is] seen as perversion of power. 
We’ve got ourselves out from under the yolk of coercive power—why would 
you willingly put yourself back in there again?
The key factor identified by interviewees that differentiates BDSM from other forms 
of oppressive power systems is its contractual status. It is the “exchange of power”, 
which several participants commented upon, that is compelling—a power dynamic 
In my case I’m not really sure if I’m transgender or not. I seem to float between. 
To look at me, I’m a physical male, but I don’t live like a male. I dress up 
and do the whole thing […] I am on hormones at the moment. I lived as a 
female for eight months, as Justine, but I didn’t feel comfortable in my skin. 
I felt like a freak. So I gave up being Justine and I’ve compromised at the 
moment, on hormones, and trying to stay soft […] Throughout my life I’ve had 
periodic extreme attractions to men. When I took hormones most recently 
my libido disappeared. But when I stopped taking them, my libido came 
back, but it came back gay, stronger than before and it’s still that way. Maybe 
this feminine thing is just another aspect of sexuality: I’m not sure whether 
that’s transgendered or gay. It’s such a fluid idea. […] I’ve got a wonderful 
relationship with my [current] spouse—it seems incongruous calling her my 
wife. I said to her, “did you ever think you’d be married to a weirdo?”
Qualifying his “weirdo” status as “not pejorative”, Ewan invokes the enabling 
potency of anomaly and ambiguity that has steered him towards a new hybrid-
becoming. After much contemplation and counseling, he later decided against 
pursuing complete gender transition (surgical reassignment and living full-time as a 
woman). Ewan reflected that part of his struggle was the social imperative to “be” 
one gender or the other, and to settle on one sexual orientation. That he did not 
“fit” the putative dominant expectations of “being” male, female, gay or straight 
presented a seemingly intractable dilemma. He eventually realised that the locus 
of his undecidability is that which permits a flexibility of gender and sexuality, and 
now describes himself as genderqueer-bisexual. Ewan’s autopoietic venture has 
thus constructed a border-zone habitus in which he moves between “male mode” 
and en femme, between his wife and male lovers, as occasions allow. Pondering his 
emergent subjectivity, Ewan mused: “So, if I’m not a woman but really a man, then 
what kind of man am I? In a word: complicated”.
Ewan’s decision not to undergo surgical reassignment (the recognition that 
undecidability is the condition of possibility for gender performativity and relationality 
with others) and Cherie’s compositing of the bisexual “trannie” body (the recognition 
that movement across, rather than the pinpointing of, positions within the gender 
field is what invites possibilities)—what they enact is a refusal to accept or settle on 
any determinate answer to the question “Who am I?” Rather, their decisions recast 
the question of the self as “What am I?”, or apropos of Spinozan understandings, 
“Of what is this body capable?” Echoing Foucault, this question is pursued not with a 
hermeneutic of the self but the care of self. Utilising various technologies of the self to 
become-other than man/woman/male/female/gay/lesbian/straight, ways of relating 
the self to self and others are negotiated as a continual transformative and reflexive 
process. As these genderqueer subjects cultivate a contemporary art of living, what 
actualises the ethical and political potential of the praxis-ideal of autopoiesis is 
WRITING FROM BELOW  1(2)-201383 84AUTOPOIETIC BISEXUAL LIVESNG-WATSON
an erotic agreement. Thus, power is transferred from the juridical location of 
institutional (transcendent) authority onto the contract (Deleuze 1991, 77). The very 
act of masochistic submission is “de-sexualized” (de-gendered) via privileging the 
sign of the contract as a mode of resistance (Deleuze 1991, 12; 1995, 142).
Importantly, then, the contractual element emerged in participant discourse as a 
productive ethical practice arising between two sexual bodies—it is an affect that 
rewrites the patriarchal gender script of male-dominant/female-subdominant, rather 
than demanding adherence to a universal law. Notions of consensus, contract, 
agreement, negotiation, trust and care were all key determinants for participants 
inclined towards BDSM. An ethos of the care of self or autopoiesis—what Watson 
(2012, 235) terms a “generative ethics of corporeality and relationality”—thus 
emerges from flows of desire between nuptial alliances that “exchange actions and 
passions” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 257). As Gilson (2011:71) argues, nuptials 
are generative processes that privilege production rather than reproduction. Such 
production detaches bodily subjection from both the privileged ground of “molar 
human” and moral prescriptions that are bound to the procreative imperative of 
sexual relationships. Watson (2012) argues that this allows an enlarged understanding 
of bisexually-desiring bodies that looks to the molecular operation of non-human 
elements. Molecularity, as Neimanis (2007, 289) argues, connects “radically different” 
entities that: 
constantly extend and disrupt the discrete bounds of our stratified bodies 
in all sorts of ways: we enter visceral becomings in mouth-becoming-apple 
or lung-becoming-smog.... Our molecularity is what allows stratified bodily 
assemblages to enter into new and surprising relationships, and to be 
transformed and reconfigured by these nuptials. 
This molecular view is crucial to understanding a Deleuzian-informed ethics based on 
“processual creativity”, which, rather than objectifying or reifying subjects, generates 
“new fields of reference” (Guattari 1996, 198). Consequently, human bodies become 
more than our biology, incorporating other elements into the molecular assemblages 
of sexual relations: whip, chains, collars, leather, polyvinyl, costumes, masks. The 
boundaries that circumscribe normative couplings are not only impermanent, via 
opening out towards multi-configurations, but also porous. These Deleuzian ideas 
about the unboundedness of corporeality, affect, and becoming-other can be pleated 
onto Foucauldian ideas about the transgressive possibilities of the body’s capacity 
for pleasure. 
We have seen how for Foucault the counter-weighing of peril with contractual-
consensual agreement intensifies sexual relations by way of novelty, tension, and 
uncertainty. Significantly, such an effect of amplified intensity is generated by making 
that is consented to, and negotiated between, willing parties. Matthew, (mid-20s, 
trans man), who experienced his early sexual years before transition as a politically-
active feminist lesbian, rebutted notions of BDSM as a repetition of patriarchal power 
structures and coercion:
The patriarchy thing assumes that a masculine person is going to be dominant 
in BDSM. I love the idea that, whilst I’m physically stronger, in a BDSM space 
I’ll give over to my female partner and she’ll have all the power and push me 
to my physical/psychological limits.
The attraction held by abdicating power also surfaced in other trans women’s 
interviews, which made observations that, anecdotally, BDSM finds favour in trans 
communities. Lisa (early 40s, trans woman) conjectured that “maybe it’s because 
we’ve had to drive ourselves so hard in our journeys to become transsexual, we like 
to relinquish some control”. But as Matthew further commented, the dominant/
submissive, top/bottom interaction is not about unequal power, as is the common 
misperception. Rather, it is about equity; for either party can say no. The submissive 
partner holds as much power through bestowing permission:
In the real world, the oppressed person/party has no ability to control what 
happens to them—they never consented to being disempowered. Consent 
is the key difference [...] There’s a little bit of danger in giving up control, and 
it requires a whole lot of trust (Matthew).
Foucault, who participated in the S&M scene of San Francisco, echoed these 
sentiments that S&M is not a hierarchical relationship of master (empowered) and 
slave (disempowered). Rather it is “regulated and open” much like a chess game 
in which either partner can fail to meet the needs and challenges of the other; it is 
ultimately a “mixture of rules and openness” that introduces “perpetual novelty” 
(Foucault 1988b, 299).
While Foucault did not elaborate on this theme in any systematic or sustained 
manner, we wish to chart a way forward by folding Foucault’s brief remarks onto 
Deleuze’s thinking on the matter and then pleating it back onto Foucauldian ideas 
about the transgressive potential of the body’s capacity for pleasure. As illuminated 
by respondents’ comments, libidinal pleasure, in the context of BDSM, entwines a 
peril that is counter-weighted against the complete trust procured within contractual 
and consensual agreement. Watson (2012, 234) points out that the power dynamics 
of such dangerous phantasm are illuminated in Deleuze’s (1991) critical essay on 
masochism, coldness and cruelty, in which he maintains that a contract of mutual 
interdependence must first exist. Power inscribed by the dominant social template 
of the majoritarian gender order is accordingly re-signified by the parties generating 
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1995, 93). Pleasure, however, is “almost devoid of meaning” and is an event “outside 
the subject”, or “at the limit of the subject, taking place in something which is 
neither of the body or the soul, which is neither inside nor outside—in short, a notion 
neither assigned nor assignable” (quoted in Halperin 1995, 93–94). Deleuze (1997) 
on the other hand, objects to the concept of pleasure because it appears to operate 
as a block or mode of resistance to the desiring-production—to urge conformity, 
coherence, and unity by negating fields of immanence. This argument relates to the 
fulcrum of Deleuze and Guattari’s (1983, 1987) writings on capitalism and sexuality—
that for them, pleasure, via the institutions of state, family and religion, is co-opted 
to the service of capital. The question is then, how can pleasure be released from the 
capitalist machine? It is on this plateau that the Deleuzian notion of desire operates 
as a productive mechanism, which makes possible “a thousand tiny sexes” that 
disrupt the unitary bind of heteronormative relations. This apparent tension between 
Foucault’s and Deleuze’s thoughts on the dynamics of resistance against normative 
regimes, however, does not imply that we must opt for the veracity of one perspective 
over the other. In comparing the two, our aim is not so much to arbitrate on their 
relative merits as to pave the way open for mutual enhancement and reciprocal 
learning. As we have demonstrated, Foucault’s and Deleuze’s respective itineraries 
can be brought together as a conceptual dialogue between pleasure and desire to 
map new cartographies of queer ethical landscapes.
Conclusion
Pondering the allure of BDSM, one participant commented: “it’s not something that 
immediately gives me a loin stirring response, [rather it is a question of] how can 
I make my lover’s experience more pleasurable?” This attitude, which illuminates 
the body’s affective capacity to resist (hetero)normative power, underlines the 
productiveness of pursuing the lines of inquiry we have drawn out in this paper. The 
foregoing discussion has shown how the Foucauldian hypothesis about pleasure as a 
force of resistance, a force for becoming-other, may not be as incommensurable with 
Deleuzian ideas on desire as production or assemblage as their respective objections 
have made it out to be. In order to pave a way through this seeming impasse, we 
have clarified in this paper the aims and objectives of the “ethical turn” in the history 
of sexuality project. We have also demonstrated in the context of bisexuality, how 
Deleuze’s and Foucault’s work both articulate and pursue a praxis-ideal of autopoiesis 
that interweaves ethical becomings with notions of the care of the self. 
To be clear, our aim is not to effect a fusion or synthesis of Deleuze’s and Foucault’s 
thinking. Rather, it is to lay the groundwork for a hospitable exchange between the 
Deleuzian and Foucauldian itineraries, an exchange that would be hospitable only to 
use of “every part of the body as a sexual instrument”(Foucault 1988b, 299). Elsewhere, 
Foucault states that participants of S&M are not seeking to disclose or uncover 
hidden erotic “tendencies deep within our unconscious”, but are rather creating 
“new possibilities of pleasure” previously unknown to the participant. Consonant with 
Deleuze, Foucault refers to such erotic practices as a creative endeavour characterised 
by the “desexualisation of pleasure” whereby “we can produce pleasure with very 
odd things, very strange parts of our bodies, in very unusual situations” (Foucault 
1997, 165). 
Foucault further describes S&M as the eroticisation of power or the eroticisation of 
strategic relations. S&M, he claims, differs from social power in that the strategic 
relations involved are always fluid, whereas the strategic relations of social power 
have been stabilised through institutions such that mobility is curtailed by courts, 
codes, and so on. What occurs in S&M is not so much a “reproduction, inside the 
erotic relationship, of the structures of power” as “an acting-out of power structures 
by a strategic game that is able to give sexual pleasure or bodily pleasure” (Foucault 
1997, 169). That is to say, S&M entails a process of invention and “the use of a strategic 
relationship as a source of pleasure (physical pleasure)” (Foucault 1997, 170). 
While there are analogous scenarios where people used strategic relations as a 
source of pleasure—for example, Middle Age “courtly love” or “pick-up” rituals of 
contemporary nightclubbing—the strategic relation in such heterosexual scenarios 
is prior to sexual contact. For Foucault, it is “a strategic relation” that enables the 
movement towards the sexual act. Conversely, in the case of S&M, such strategic 
relations are within the act of sex as “a convention of pleasure within a particular 
situation” (Foucault 1997, 170). Importantly, for Foucault, the strategic relations 
enacted in the scene of courtship are purely social relations which involve the 
individual as social being, whilst in the scene of S&M it is the body that is involved.
Foucault’s observation that S&M practice entails a transduction of power-strategic 
relations (and thus holds the potential to interrupt prevailing modes of normativity), 
dovetails with Deleuze’s observation above that the dominant social template of 
the majoritarian gender order is re-signified by the parties generating an erotic 
agreement. But where Deleuze adopts the analytic of “desire” to explore the ethico-
political possibilities ushered by the corporeal connections and affective becomings 
of BDSM, Foucault adopts the analytic of “pleasure” instead. Foucault was 
curious about pleasure because it appears to escape “the medical and naturalistic 
connotations inherent in the notion of desire... There is no ‘pathology’ of pleasure, 
no ‘abnormal’ pleasure”. As illustrated by Foucault’s genealogy of the Christian 
confessional apparatus that traces a line to the will to knowledge-power of modern 
human sciences, desire “has been used as a tool, as a grid of intelligibility… a basis 
onto which that psychologico-medical armature can attach itself” (quoted in Halperin 
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the extent that it does not efface the specificities of and differences between their 
respective ideas, embracing instead the tensions generated in the encounter as a 
fecund ground for the rhizomatic outgrowth of the new. One way forward to develop 
the dialogical exchange is to stage a conversation between the Deleuzian reading of 
the Body without organs (BwO) and the Foucauldian reading of the anarchic body-
as-event (Oksala 2004). This line of inquiry could take into account Deleuze’s ideas 
about de/re-territorialisation and Foucault’s early writings on transgression as the 
movement that marks the limit in its very crossing (Foucault 1977). And as we have 
indicated at various points throughout the paper, this dialogical exchange could be 
mapped onto the broader inquiries being developed across the humanities and the 
social sciences that investigate an ontology of becoming with such concepts as affect 
and intensity (Clough and Halley 2007; Coole and Frost 2010; Gregg and Seigworth 
2010). 
The Deleuzo-Foucauldian approach articulated here has benefitted from applying 
this to critical interrogation of empirical realities. By way of case studies from Watson’s 
(2012) doctoral research, we have presented a more nuanced understanding of 
bisexuality that endeavours to foreground its value for, and visibility and viability in 
queer scholarship. As such, we offer a provocation to the way in which the humanities 
and social sciences construct knowledge of our “subjects”. If fluidity, diversity and 
multiplicity are problematic empirical concepts, then these need to constitute the 
epistemic landscape from which questions are open to possibilities and becomings 
of the bisexual subject, rather constrained by conceptual definitions. Respondents’ 
narratives are at once individual, unique and personal, while addressing and engaging 
with the socio-cultural and ethico-political fields that their lives encounter. 
The problem of liberation, as voiced by participants, was not one of advancing 
bisexuality as a panacea for socio-sexual disharmony, but one of rupturing the 
seemingly intractable molarities and hierarchies of sex/gender and sexuality. For 
Guattari (1996, 204), this ought to be more accurately conceived as a liberation of 
desire. Foucault (1990a, 159), on the other hand, may conceive of it as the articulation 
of “a different economy of bodies and pleasures”. The differences notwithstanding, 
the empirical, fleshy realities of (bi)sexuality presented in this paper have opened 
a door to welcome the fruitful conversations to come between the Deleuzian and 
Foucauldian itineraries: encounters of mutual enhancement and reciprocal learning, 
new ways of que(e)rying and (un)becoming.
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